Russia occupied the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine in March 2022. Since then, Europe has lived in fear of a nuclear accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began operations on September 1, 2022 that have allowed it to permanently monitor the plant. This is an “unprecedented mission for an international agency,” explains its director, Rafael Grossi (Buenos Aires, 63 years old), in a telephone interview with EL PAÍS. For two years, Grossi himself and his technicians have even been under fire: to access the Zaporizhia plant, they must do so from the territory of free Ukraine and must cross one of the most active war fronts.
The IAEA mission is one of the few diplomatic successes in the Ukraine war, although Grossi believes that this is only “partial”: “The success will come when the conflict ends, which is a complex matter, or at least when it enters a phase of provisional agreement and we can say that we managed to get through this period without a nuclear accident.” The IAEA director is convinced that the presence of this UN agency in Zaporizhia and its diplomatic insistence that the plant “not be attacked or militarized has had a mitigating, even deterring, effect.”
Ask. Is this the most dangerous operation in the history of the IAEA?
Answer. Probably yes. It has forced us to deploy personnel into combat zones, it has forced our teams and even myself to be under direct fire. But this adds a bit of drama and what is important is the mission.
P. You are probably the only ones crossing the war front. How do you do it?
R. It requires delicate negotiations. It is a combat zone and between the last Ukrainian checkpoint and the first Russian checkpoint there is a grey zone that nobody controls. The Agency must ensure that there is a kind of temporary truce, which is negotiated with Ukrainians and Russians. A series of information parameters must be given to each side to ensure that for a certain period of time, of hours or days, there is what is called “silence”, that there is no military activity. But the security of the passage is never guaranteed. The first time we passed, I was leading that team, we were under fire for two minutes in the grey zone. We will never know who was responsible. But we have already made 22 rotations of our teams.
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P. How long do your teams stay at the plant?
R. Generally, it is three weeks or more. Sometimes, because the conflict intensified, they had to stay longer. On other occasions, there was no agreement between the contenders to allow passage or there were disagreements about the route.
P. Do they always cross at the same point on the front? The route must be slow, due to the level of destruction on the roads.
R. I cannot give details of the location, for safety reasons, but we usually follow the same route. At one time, another route was used. This must also be negotiated, because each party has its own interest in one route or another. And yes, the route is a lunar landscape of destruction.
P. What moments have been the most dangerous for the lives of your inspectors?
R. There have been several occasions. The first was to go where no one had gone before and be under direct fire. I remember November 2022, when there was a very strong attack on the plant for a whole weekend and our experts were there. These attacks are punctual. Last April there was an attack in places where our experts travel. [y en el que resultaron heridos militares rusos].
P. However, incidents continue to occur regularly; this August there was a serious fire inside the plant. What happened?
R. We have done a fairly thorough investigation and have managed to determine a few things. One is that the hypothesis of a self-inflicted fire, originating at the base of this cooling tower, has been ruled out. [el presidente ucranio, Volodímir Zelenski, aseguró que los rusos habían provocado el incendio]. It was a major fire that has rendered the tower unusable. If the plant is to operate again in the future, the tower would have to be demolished and a new one built. We have determined important things so that the actors involved and the international community can draw conclusions.
P. In their public statements, they avoid pointing out the responsibility of any of the parties in the attacks or incidents in Zaporizhia. Why?
R. There is enormous anxiety and even a demand – not only from Russia and Ukraine, but also from the countries that line up behind them, as well as from journalists and analysts – to see the Agency become a kind of judge who hands out yellow and red cards. But what characterizes the IAEA is that we only make statements attributing responsibility in a definitive way when we have the ability to prove with certainty that there is only one person responsible for a given episode. We focus on the sin rather than the sinner. We say: “Whoever is behind this, it cannot be happening.” We must not forget that the continuity of our function also depends on the acceptance of two countries at war. I cannot put my mission at risk. When I appear before the UN Security Council, and in these sessions no one agrees on anything, all members do agree that it is essential for the IAEA to be there.
P. Have any specific responsibilities been identified in Zaporizhia?
R. We haven’t done it directly, but sometimes we have had important dialogues, privately, about certain episodes.
P. Do your technicians always live in the same addresses in the municipality of Energodar so that the Ukrainian army knows where they are?
R. They live on the factory floor because it is safer, for reasons of confidentiality and because they have technical equipment that must be extremely protected.
P. Are your technicians free to inspect the plant as they see fit?
R. We have a daily, weekly and monthly programme of inspector activity, as well as specific activities if something happens, such as an attack. Negotiations must be made, not only with the Russian operator of the plant. [la empresa estatal Rosatom] but also with the security authorities. Sometimes there is an immediate agreement, sometimes there is a partial agreement, or it happens later. But in general terms we have all the access we need.
P. What military forces are there at the plant?
R. The plant’s security is the responsibility of the Rosgvárdia militarized police. There is a smaller contingent of the Armed Forces specializing in chemical, radiological and biological emergencies.
P. Can your inspectors speak freely with plant operators, without the presence of armed personnel?
R. In most cases, yes.
P. The Ukrainian authorities, and the IAEA as well, have stressed the psychological pressure on Ukrainian personnel operating the plant. Is this still the case?
R. That is still the case. It is a front-line power station, and people there are still under constant stress. Many people have stayed there, but with separated families. Some people have moved permanently into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Others have decided to stay because it is their life, it is their job. These are ordinary people, and their whole life was centred on work at the power station.
P. On August 27, you visited the Russian Kursk power plant, which is at risk due to the Ukrainian offensive. Have you discussed this with the Ukrainian side?
R. I will be in Ukraine next week, and I hope to meet with President Zelensky and several ministers. Of course, I have had diplomatic talks with them in recent days.
P. What are the differences between the risk of accidents in Kursk and Zaporizhia?
R. The military incursion into Kursk, if we look at the maps, has been projected in the direction of the plant. The closest offensive point to the plant is a couple of dozen kilometres away, which makes the situation objectively dangerous. The plant is within range of artillery, and it must be added that it is an RBMK-type plant, similar to the one that existed in Chernobyl, plants that have an external core, without a concrete and metal dome to protect it. The eventuality of an impact, even from a drone, can generate a very significant radioactive leak.
P. Would you recommend living in the regions close to the central Zaporizhia today?
R. Living near a combat zone is something I would not recommend to anyone, whether there is a nuclear power plant or not. It is true that certain politicians involve nuclear power plants in a conflict because the risk of an accident creates panic; it has a psychological or military value.
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